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REVIEWS

Meeting the Enemy
Robert F. Nagelt
The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. Robert H. Bork.
Macmillan, New York, 1990. Pp xiv, 432.

I.
When roughly forty percent of American law professors proclaimed their opposition to the appointment of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court,' what were they announcing about their profession
and themselves? In The Tempting of America,2 Bork contends
that the opposition revealed the legal academy's subordination-even rejection-of legal norms, and he argues that this devaluation of law is a part of broader anti-intellectual movement
based within the universities. He insists that this movement poses
a grave threat to our constitutional system and, more generally, to
the health of our political culture. Bork goes so far as to argue that
those who are most responsible for intellectual values lie in order
to achieve their immediate political objectives, and that they systematically engage in cynical fabrications in order to displace the
right of the people to govern.3
t Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I
appreciate the helpful comments of Christopher Mueller, Gene Nichol, Pierre Schlag, and
Steven Smith. My thinking was also influenced by Professor George L. Priest's statement at
the Bork hearings; his testimony is printed in Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 2439 (1987). Neither my colleagues nor Professor
Priest, however, should be blamed for what I have written.
1 Kenneth B. Noble, Bork Panel Ends Hearings, NY Times B9 (Oct 1, 1987).
2 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
(Macmillan, 1990). All parenthetical page references appearing in the text and notes are to
this book.
3 Bork repeatedly asserts that jurists and scholars use constitutional doctrines as
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These are extreme charges and Bork makes them bluntly. For
a law professor, the temptation is great to belittle Bork's book as a
rehash of an inadequate legal philosophy and a slightly paranoid
counter-attack on his political tormentors; more charitably, one
might be inclined to describe it as a forceful polemic understandably provoked by a galling and humiliating experience. Such descriptions are tempting in part because, while the book is more
than these things, it is all of these things. But there is another
reason for academics to be inclined to dismiss the book: we law
professors are, after all, the targets of Bork's serious accusations. If
Bork's book is suspicious because it is self-serving, quick rejection
of his charges by legal scholars would also be suspicious for the
same reason.
There is, moreover, much that is plausible about Bork's major
claims. As the former Alexander Bickel Professor at Yale Law
School, Solicitor General of the United States, and Judge of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Bork in
many ways personifies the law as a discipline and a profession; in a
loose metaphoric sense, his defeat did represent the rejection of
Law. More importantly,.support for the various elements of Bork's
indictment of his former colleagues can be found throughout the
academic literature itself. Bork is hardly the first to note the
strong and convenient convergence of constitutional conclusions
and political preferences.4 He is alone neither in his apprehension
at the ferocity of the modern intellectual assault on the idea of
law5 nor in his belief that the current practice of political judging
fabrications to cover their political objectives and thus to thwart the will of the people. (pp
6-7, 261-65) For example, in response to Justice Douglas's comment that Reynolds v Sims,
377 US 533 (1964), "is founded not on what we think governmental policy should be, but on
what the Equal Protection Clause requires," (p 90, quoting Harper v Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 US 663, 670 (1966)), Bork writes: "Douglas must have enjoyed that line." (p
90) He adds:
The practice of stating emphatically that the Court was not doing precisely what the
Court was doing was common in the years of the Warren Court. (p 91)
Bork claims that law schools "regularly" teach a view of the judicial process that is "profoundly cynical." (p 71) In addition, he includes scholars in his charge that opponents of his
confirmation knowingly misrepresented facts about him. (p 337)
" The present Dean of the University of Michigan Law School, for example, penetrates
free speech doctrines to show how "[c]laims about the history and the language of the First
Amendment... are often nothing less than misrepresentations" and are ultimately used in
the service of a "self-protective political strategy." Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society:
Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America 102 (Oxford, 1986). The former Dean
of the Stanford Law School made the same point more broadly. John Hart Ely, Foreword:
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv L Rev 5, 37-38 (1978).
5 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 271-75 (Harvard, 1986). Two other
articulate examples are Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?,41 Stan L Rev 1233 (1989) (review-

1990]

Meeting the Enemy

is deeply illegitimate.6 Even some of Bork's small touches-for example, his belief that contemporary constitutional theory is not
worth reading and his apparently heartfelt resolution to stop reading it (p 255)-are sentiments that many legal scholars will recognize, if not confess, as their own.
Even without the recent explosion of interest in liberal democratic institutions throughout Eastern Europe and in South Africa,
I think we would have recognized that an important part of Bork's
argument is both serious and accurate. But the perspective cast by
those splendid events makes graphically clear the precious, selfabsorbed, immoderate quality in much of the academic commentary on American constitutional law. Constitutional theorizing,
protected and nourished by an enormously successful political system, has grown luxuriant-often both irrelevant and reckless. We
academics ask for so much from constitutional interpretation, and
in the pursuit of these ambitions we casually question whether our
system ought to be democratic, whether it is possible for judges to
follow legal rules, and whether even modest institutional stability
is desirable. Yet we understand so little about the fundamental
preconditions for what others, who can take less for granted, seek
so urgently: publicly accountable government and the rule of law.
Perhaps Bork exaggerates when he characterizes the legal academy
as a unified, cynical, purposeful threat to our form of government;
there is, however, enough to what he says to warrant some abashed
introspection. We ought not to pretend otherwise simply because
Bork is the messenger.
Even if Bork is right in important respects, he is, of course,
not entirely right. Few in academia, however, can be trusted to be
especially objective in separating truth from exaggeration in this
book. I, for instance, am a member of the post-realist, Vietnam-era
generation at which Bork points the finger of blame.7 And, as will

ing Mark Tushnet, Red White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law
(Harvard, 1988)); and William Ewald, Unger's Philosophy:A CriticalLegal Study, 97 Yale
L J 665 (1988).
6 Although Herbert Wechsler's strictures on neutral principles, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 Harv L Rev 1 (1959), have taken a heavy beating in recent
years, important scholars continue to denounce the Court for unprincipled imposition of
values. See, for example, Ely, 92 Harv L Rev 5 (cited in note 4); and Michael J. Perry, Why
the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment
on Harris v. McRae, 32 Stan L Rev 1113, 1127 (1980). Some of these denunciations are as
fervent as Bork's and often involve the same cases. See, for example, John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L J 920 (1973).
7 Bork writes:
Only recently ... have intellectual class policies been advanced with the ferocity and, it
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become clear, I do not believe in the possibility of apolitical law in
the way that Bork does. Most of' the legal writers whose work I
admire reject Bork's approach to constitutional law, and they vociferously opposed his confirmation. For me the matter is complicated because I supported Bork's confirmation, but wrote approvingly of aspects of the hearings that led to his rejection.8
Despite my peculiar mixture of identifications and beliefs, I
was flatly dismayed at the role the legal academy played in Bork's
defeat. I would guess that many who read this book will recognize
they too were disturbed by that role and will wonder why the issue
dropped from sight so quickly. The disturbing aspect of the scholarly opposition lies not in the identity of the person placed on the
Court, but in the questions raised about the character of the enterprise in which we are engaged. The Bork hearings momentarily illuminated doubts about legal scholarship that have been obscured
for a long time. While Bork's interpretation of the hearings is
wrong on many incidentals, it is right on some fundamentals. He
reminds us that our profession is too willing to trifle with serious
ideas and important institutions. He reminds us that both knowledge and democracy depend on more than brilliant minds and
good intentions. Although his book is itself intemperate, Bork is
right to insist on the necessity for civility, self-restraint, and
integrity.
The predictable reply to what I have suggested so far is this:
There were good and sufficient reasons for opposing Bork, so
neither the events surrounding his nomination nor his book analyzing those events raises significant doubts about the character and
role of the legal academy. My response, which I develop in the
course of this review, is that the most conscientious doubts about
Bork's fitness were directed, not at his political beliefs, but at his
intellectual qualities. These qualities are widely shared among law
professors (although they are not, of course, universal) and are especially visible in the writings of the elite theorists who tend to
represent our professional aspirations. The best reason to oppose

must be said, the intellectual dishonesty that was manifested in the nomination campaign. What is new is the addition to the intellectual class of a group associated with,
indeed responsible for, the rebelliousness and turmoil in the universities in the late
1960s. (p 338)
Although I criticized the extent to which jurisprudential and doctrinal vocabulary
dominated the hearings, I praised the Senate's effort to achieve some control over the Court
and I urged that this effort might be more successful if confirmation hearings were more
unapologetically political. See Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw U L
Rev (forthcoming, 1990).
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Bork, in short, was that he reminded us of ourselves; if we rightfully condemned him, we condemned our profession. Indeed, I suspect that mixed in with all the other fuel that fed the intense, almost exhilarated academic opposition to Bork was something close
to self-hatred.
II.
The author of The Tempting of America certainly does not
present himself as the mirror of the legal professoriat. He depicts
the academy as a specialized and sophisticated "clerisy of power"
(p 250) and describes its work product as "abstruse" and "convoluted." (p 134) The "clerisy," he charges, uses its intellectualism to
mask and mystify its political objectives. (p 250) In contrast, Bork
models himself after the more practical writers of earlier eras. Like
the Constitution itself, which he says was "addressed to the common sense of the people" (pp 5, 134), 9 Bork speaks with an uncomplicated vocabulary aimed at ordinary citizens. The relationship
that he attempts to establish with the American people is the opposite of the relationship that he accuses the academy of establishing. Bork tries to defrock the judges and the professors, to report
directly to the general public on the real agenda of the intellectual
class. He describes that agenda as nothing less than the cultural
and political dominance of left-liberal intellectuals-the equivalent
of a "coup d'6tat," the true nature of which has been concealed by
elaborate rationalizations obligingly adopted by the federal judiciary.10 Bork writes with a kind of populist confidence, apparently
secure in the belief that, if words are plainly used, the public will
reject the crassly political lawlessness of the educated classes as
constitutional "heresy." (p 7)
There is much to admire in Bork's report to Americans. It can
be useful, even crucial, to address the public generally and to
couch constitutional debate in terms of larger cultural conflicts.
Bork is right to insist, against the academic fashion, that erudite
and creative thinking has no special claim to legitimacy in public
law, and that even in scholarship the simple truths-for all their
lack of surprise-may still be true. While he oversimplifies considerably when he lumps everyone from Ronald Dworkin to Duncan
Kennedy into a monolithic "left-liberal elite" (pp 187-221), he is
I Quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States vii
(Da Capo, 1970).
10 Bork refers to "coups" (pp 215, 265), "judicial revisionism" (p 128), "lawlessness" (p
44), "infiltration" (p 246), and "judicial despotism" (p 41), as well as "heresy" (p 7).
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still essentially correct to depict legal academics and their scholarship as largely a force for leftist politics. As he suggests, there is an
incestuous relationship among judges, their law clerks, and the
clerks' professors, through which the politics of the academy are
funnelled into the case law. (p 135-36) Although the same could be
said about some right-wing politics, it is true that left-wing activism can be at once cloyingly tolerant and relentlessly self-righteous." (pp 243-45) Anyone who has served on an academic appointments committee, read law reviews, folloWed judicial
decisions, or noted ABA resolutions knows that Bork is onto something when he says that political considerations now suffuse every
issue taken up by the legal elite, from assessing intellectual capacity to defining the law. Of course, it is likely that under a veneer of
high-mindedness and objectivity, politics in some version has always exercised a heavy influence on both scholarship and judging.
Even so, Bork is right to focus on what seems to be a widespread
modern trend: the loss of that veneer and the pervasiveness of the
belief that even attempts at political neutrality are worthless or
destructive. 2
As a long-time participant in academic debates and in judging,
Bork cannot completely distance himself from what he criticizes;
he writes as a dissenter from within the legal establishment, almost
as an apostate, disclosing to the wider public the significance of the
intellectual practices that he now sees as dangerous. This prolific
Chicago School economist and constitutional theorist reports on
the obscuring effects of scholars' "vast outpouring of words" and
"arcane inquiries." (p 134) Much of the book is an effort to decode
", For a recent, vivid illustration, see Michael H. v Gerald D., 109 S Ct 2333, 2349, 2351
(1988) (Brennan dissenting)(arguing that privacy rights should be extended to adulterous,
putative fathers because our society is "a facilative, pluralistic one, in which we must be
willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellant practices" and also that the
contrary view is "stagnant, archaic, hidebound ... steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a long past").
12 This trend was perhaps the most striking aspect of the Bork hearings. As recently as
1983, Mark Tushnet could write:
A ritual is enacted whenever a nominee for a federal judgeship appears .... One Senator will ask, "Do you intend to apply the law rather than make it?" Another will ask,
"Will you apply the words of the Constitution in the way the framers intended?" Nominees ... play their part in the ritual by answering "Yes" to both questions.
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 Harv L Rev 781, 781 (1983). A few years later, Bork was skewered when
he tried to answer "yes" to those questions. A forthright call from the mainstream to drop
the veneer can be found in Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword:The Vanishing Constitution, 103
Harv L Rev 43 (1989).
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current legal writing so that its substance can be seen for what it
is-flimsy, sometimes bizarre, and subversive. (p 135)
Bork's commentary on the content of constitutional theorizing
is often telling. Since his standard is common sense and his audience the general public, he sometimes just shoots the fish in the
barrel. He notes Laurence Tribe's never-ending quest to justify
Roe v Wade 3 and quotes Tribe's fatuous effort to invoke "Abraham Lincoln's warning, voiced on a previous occasion when the nation was deeply divided over a different issue of fundamental liberty, that the Union could not long endure 'half slave and half
free.'" (p 203)'" There is much material of this kind: Tribe's views
on "chemical predilections" and obscenity (pp 204-05); David A. J.
Richards's announcement of "the principle of love as a civil liberty" (p 211);15 Mark Tushnet's declaration that he would decide
cases according to what is "likely to advance the cause of socialism" (p 214);16 Paul Brest's suggestion that the criterion for constitutional interpretation should be the advancement of "the well-being of our society" (p 208); 17 and so on.
Ridicule is not the stuff of serious intellectual exchange, but
Bork's purpose is not so much to debate as to expose, and (as opponents of Bork's confirmation certainly know) there is value in
laying before the American public the occasional silliness of intellectuals who try to influence public affairs. At any rate, Bork's report often goes beyond ridicule to analysis and rebuttal. He observes, for example, that the current "torrent" of interest in theory
is a sign of institutional weakness and self-doubt. (pp 133, 138)
The energetic, sometimes outlandish efforts to legitimate reformist
judging communicate more anxiety than justification. 8 More spe-

,3410 US 113 (1973).
" Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw § 15-10 at 1351 (Foundation, 2d ed
1988). Bork comments, "Lincoln certainly never suggested that the cure for a nation half
slave and half free was for the Supreme Court to end slavery by inventing the thirteenth
amendment." (p 203)
"I David A. J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings L J 957, 1005
(1979) (emphasis omitted).
6 Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Ohio St L J 411, 424

(1981).
'" Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 BU L Rev
204, 226 (1980).
," Mark Tushnet has commented that "constitutional theory matters in the way that a
fairly high fever matters-though it has no independent significance, it is a symptom of an
underlying disorder in the body politic." Mark V. Tushnet, Does Constitutional Theory
Matter?: A Comment, 65 Tex L Rev 777, 777 (1987). Occasionally someone actually admits
to personal anxiety. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature,60 Tex L Rev 373, 385-86 (1982).
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cifically, Bork notes that the important intellectual achievements
of modern theorists-for instance, the deepening (and consequent
complication) of our ideas about drafters' intent and textual meaning (pp 213-14)-are fundamentally inconsistent with judicial review, so that the sophisticated theorizing is at odds with the theorists' preferred institutional recommendations. In order to salvage
these recommendations, scholars are forced to make unrealistic assumptions about the resources and abilities of judges. Bork is
properly skeptical, for instance, about the political usefulness of
the discipline of moral philosophy, and he makes the refreshingly
simple observation that judges have neither the training nor the
time for moral philosophy anyway. (p 191)
According to Bork's analysis, the key tactic of modern constitutional interpretation is epitomized by the reliance on "penumbras" in Griswold v Connecticut: the expansion of a limited or partial right that is protected by the text of the Constitution into a
general value that is not. He sees this technique not only in the
privacy cases, but also in Ely's "representation-reinforcement"
model (p 196), in Tribe's "antisubjugation principle" (pp 201-02),
in Dworkin's distinction between concepts and conceptions (pp
213-14), in Justice Brennan's ideal of "human dignity" (p 219),
and in Siegan's economic liberties. (p 224) While Bork does not
attempt a systematic criticism of the strategy of generalization, he
repeatedly makes two powerful points: (1) the framers' decision
about where to stop is as important and as worthy of respect as
their decision where to go (pp 196, 198); and (2) every expansion of
rights diminishes "the liberty of the individuals who make up a
community to regulate their affairs ... ." (p 229)
More than any of his other positions, Bork's commitment to
democratic decisionmaking places him in sharp contrast to modern
academic fashion. That fashion, as expressed in our leading law
journals, permits the performance of the United States Congress to
be mocked with an incredulous exclamation point; 19 it permits belief in the principle of electoral accountability to be dismissed with
the word "curious." 0 Against a confident, inventive assault on the

'" Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev
1281, 1311 (1976): "And to retreat to the notion that the legislature itself-Congress!-is in
some mystical way adequately representative of all the interests at stake ... is to impose
democratic theory by brute force on observed institutional behavior."
20 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 Mich L Rev 20, 59
(1988): "Legitimacy is maintained, the argument might go, not by allowing willful judges to
update the laiv, but by respecting legislative supremacy (and therefore democratic govern-

ment). This argument ...

strikes me as curious."
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moral legitimacy of legislative decisionmaking, Bork raises this unfashionable, unoriginal-but important-idea:
The often untidy responses of the elected branches possess
virtues and benefits that the "principled" reactions of courts
do not. Our popular institutions . . . were structured to provide safety, to achieve compromise . . . , to slow change, to
dilute absolutisms. They both embody and produce wholesome inconsistencies. They are designed, in short, to do the
very things that abstract generalizations.., tend to bring into
contempt. (pp 352-53)
Together with his emphasis on framers' intent and his thorough-going commitment to neutrality in law, Bork's defense of
democratic values makes him the unapologetic embodiment of
most of the significant ideas that have been under attack by constitutional theorists for over thirty years. The sweep of his criticisms reaches from Bruce Ackerman to Richard Epstein to Ronald
Dworkin to Alexander Bickel to Duncan Kennedy to Michael
Perry to John Ely to James Thayer. It only makes matters worse
that he expresses these positions in an unmodulated writing style
aimed at a general audience. In short, the author of The Tempting
of America presents himself as the Anti-Scholar.
Given the position that he assumes, the academy undoubtedly
will give lovingly detailed attention to the various deficiencies in
Bork's jurisprudence and sociology. And deficiencies there are. But
we should hesitate before undertaking the predictable demolition
because what is wrong with Bork's ideas is not much different from
what is wrong with the ideas of mainstream constitutional scholars.
Indeed, the closer Bork's book is examined, the harder it is to distinguish the author from the rest of us.
III.
Bork describes the idea of political judging as a "heresy" (pp
6-7), and refers to judicial "civil disobedience" and "limited coups
d'6tat" perpetrated by the Supreme Court. (p 265) Scholars who
are squeamish about overstatement might be inclined to criticize
this language as the sort of rhetoric appropriate only in political
campaigns, union organizing, faculty meetings, and other unpleasantly sweaty events.
Professors will be even further perturbed by Bork's assurances
that, in contrast, there is "nothing extreme" about his own views.
(p 280) Bork describes the doctrine of substantive due process as
"utter[ly] illegitima[te]" (p 32); he labels the process of deriving
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rights from sources such as "the essential nature of all free governments"2 1 as "preposterous" and "judicial despotism." (pp 41, 119)
He criticizes the application of the desegregation principle to the
federal government as "social engineering from the bench," and
the reapportionment decisions as examples of "disregard for the
Constitution." (p 84) He condemns .not only the work of Justice
William Brennan, but also that of Justices Samuel Miller (for
adopting a position that would lead to "despotism"), Oliver Wendell Holmes (for the deferential standard of review proposed in his
Lochner dissent), John Marshall Harlan (for his "entirely legislative" arguments based on tradition), and-in one swoop-William
Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia (for assuming an "illegitimate
power" when deriving rights from the "most specific tradition
available").22 For Bork, it seems, the heretics are everywhere and
he stands alone representing orthodoxy.
Although it is offensive for Bork to claim the mantle of reasonableness for himself while condemning the work and ideas of so
many responsible and intelligent jurists, his sweeping condemnations might be forgiven as the kind of excess common (as Bork
himself knows well) in politics; this is, after all, not primarily an
academic book. But Bork's posture is not merely a matter of combativeness; he means what he says. He has insisted for many
years-including in testimony before Congress-that the courts are
engaged in a pattern of illegal conduct.2 3 The fact is that Bork believes that his approach to constitutional law is right and that just
about every other current jurist and scholar is wrong. Thus the
problem with Bork's book is not the extreme phrasing it contains
but the towering intellectual self-assurance it displays.
We have, however, seen that kind of self-assurance before. It
was evident, for example, in Laurence Tribe's assertion that Bork's
views set him apart "from the entire 200-year-old tradition of

21
22
23

Loan Assn. v Topeka, 87 US (20 Wall) 655, 663 (1874).
See pp 41 (Miller), 45 (Holmes), 234 (Harlan), and 240 (Rehnquist and Scalia).
In 1981, Bork testified that Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973), was "an unconstitutional

decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiable judicial usurpation of State legislative authority.
. . ." He added, "I also think that Roe v. Wade is by no means the only example of such
unconstitutional behavior by the Supreme Court." He suggested that the Human Life Bill
(which would have deemed human life to exist from conception for purposes of the Due
Process Clause) would alter "the constitutional function of the courts as we have known it
since Marbury v. Madison," but described this change as "no more drastic than that which
the judiciary has accomplished over the past 25 years." The Human Life Bill, Hearings on S
158 before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 310-11 (1981)("Human Life Hearings").
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thought about rights that underlies the American Constitution. '24
Since Tribe presumed to speak on behalf of an entire 200-year tradition, it is not especially surprising that in the same statement he
testified for all of those who established the Constitution (saying
that "no understanding of the Constitution could be further [than
the theory of original intent] from the clear purpose of those who
wrote and ratified the Constitution. .. ').15 Or that he spoke for all
of the "105 past and present Justices of the Supreme Court" (none
of whose views were as "radical" as Bork's).2 6 Or that on occasion
he has purported to know the thinking of all respectable legal
scholars on controversial issues; 2 7 or that, like Bork, he is very
often certain about the true meaning of complicated constitutional
provisions. 1
The former Alexander Bickel Professor from Yale, then, is excessively definite, harshly critical, and heroically confident, and in
these characteristics he resembles the Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law from Harvard-who resembles the distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence from Oxford. Recall that after Bork's nomination, Ronald Dworkin, like Tribe, presumed to speak for
everyone and invoked the idea of heresy: "Bork is a constitutional
2'
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong, 1st Sess
1278 (1987) ("Bork Hearings").
25 Id at 1279.

26 Id at 1281.
27 For example, in voicing his opposition to the Human Life Bill, Tribe referred to a
letter of opposition signed by eighteen distinguished scholars and public servants and asked
why the bill "should have called forth such an unprecedented unison ofvoices. . . ." He then
suggested that the "most likely reason ... is that virtually all careful students of the Constitution-those who write and teach about it, as well as those sworn to enforce it"-agreed
with his position. Human Life Hearings at 255-56 (cited in note 23).
28 The Human Life Bill, for instance, involved difficult interpretative issues arising out
of both Roe v Wade and the various cases defining Congress's power to enforce Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, Tribe claimed that no "truly reasonable basis"
existed to support the constitutionality of the Bill-that "invalidity... is the only plausible
verdict to which a considered analysis can lead. . .." Human Life Hearings at 256 (cited in
note 23) (emphasis in original). Well, perhaps Tribe was being uncharacteristically fervent
on this issue? Here is Professor Tribe on the Religious Speech Protection Act: "H.R. 4996 is
a clearly, and I underline the word 'clearly,' constitutional exercise of Congress['s] power."
Religious Speech Protection Act, Hearing on HR 4996 before the Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 98th Cong, 2nd Sess 46-47 (1984). Similarly, Tribe co-authored a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy on the constitutionality of the "line-item veto." The letter concludes that
"any attempt to exercise such a 'line-item veto' would clearly be unconstitutional." 135
Cong Rec S14387 (Oct 31, 1989). A thoughtful explanation of the actual complexities of this
issue can be found in J. Gregory Sidak and Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto:
A Reply To Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw U L Rev (forthcoming, 1990).
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radical who rejects a requirement of the rule of law that all sides
S...

had previously accepted."' 9 Harsh criticism? Dworkin wrote

that Bork's philosophy is "not just impoverished and unattractive
but no philosophy at all."30 In language eerily similar to Bork's
own, Dworkin dismissed Bork's conclusion that homosexuality is
not constitutionally protected as "the jurisprudence of fiat."'" Certainly not all of the professors who opposed Bork's nomination recognized something familiar in his arrogant intellectualism. But it is
safe to say that a very large number of law professors (including
me) try to stake out positions that are different from everyone
else's, criticize uninhibitedly, and generally write with a degree of
authority to which we are not entitled.
Bork may seem unique, nonetheless, in that his condemnation
of judges and the authority of their decisions is so complete; it is
one thing to be intellectually confident but another to recklessly
call into doubt so much of what so many courts have done for so
long. Accordingly, although many may be self-assured, it is Bork
who is said to be "outside the mainstream." This response underestimates the force and ambition of academic commentary. Bork is
indeed at odds with much legal authority, and his criticism of
anchoring substantive due process rights in tradition seems especially extreme, separating him from positions taken even by Justices Harlan and Scalia. These criticisms, however, are no more
far-reaching than John Hart Ely's devastating work on the same
subject.2 Michael Perry's early writing depicts virtually all of
modern constitutional law as illegitimate, except insofar as it is
justified by some functional theory that has never been imagined,
let alone adopted, in any decision that I have read.3 3 While Bork
rejects much *authority, both scholarly and legal, he could not reject more than Mark Tushnet does in his recent, respected book.-4
In criticizing the privacy cases, does Bork repudiate more precedent than the academic critics who took on the Court's hundredyear-long refusal to enforce the Free Speech Clause? More than
the progressive realists when they condemned pre-1937 activism on
29 Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, NY Rev Books 3 (Aug 13, 1987) ("The Bork

Nomination").
30 Id at 10.
3' Ronald Dworkin, Reagan's Justice, NY Rev Books 27, 31 (Nov 8, 1984).
3' Ely, 92 Harv L Rev 5 (cited in note 4).
33 Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights 11, 24, 91 (Yale,
1982).
3' Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law
(Harvard, 1988).
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economic issues? More than the process theorists who described
the main work of the Warren Court as usurpation?
Everyone knows that in constitutional law, not only scholars
but also judges defy whole lines of authority. In the face of specific
constitutional text and many decisions directly to the contrary,
Justices Brennan and Marshall continue to insist that the death
penalty is inherently unconstitutional. And well they might, for
many firmly established doctrines have been discarded, including
"separate but equal," the non-application of the Bill of Rights to
the states, economic due process, the "bad tendency" rule in free
speech cases, the political question doctrine in reapportionment
and prison cases, and so on. Moreover, many of the Court's most
important decisions-New York Times v Sullivan, Miranda v Arizona, Griswold v Connecticut, and Roe v Wade come to
mind-were departures, reversing long-held understandings on the
basis of sometimes casual and occasionally incomprehensible references to prior cases. In a country that saw very little judicial review in the first half of its history and saw such review frequently
exercised in lurching defiance of precedent during the second half,
Bork's willingness to rethink case law puts him in the company of
many eminent jurists.
One might try to differentiate Bork from this critical tradition
on the ground that the destruction of theory and doctrine is usually accompanied by some positive suggestion, giving the resulting
innovations in the case law a creative kind of integrity. Bork does,
however, offer a positive theory-original intent-that even has an
established lineage. Moreover, Bork's argument is precisely that
original intent would align the cases better with the Constitution
as it is properly understood. Like most theorists and judges, he
justifies apparently radical recommendations by claiming that they
represent an underlying continuity, a realization of the true
Constitution.
Probably the least attractive aspect of Bork's iconoclasm is
that, while intended to be intensely serious, it sometimes pushes
fundamentally accurate observations so far as to verge on the frivolous or even nutty. He asserts, for example, that for the past fifty
years the Court has never departed from the framers' intent in order to establish "an item on the conservative agenda." (p 130)
(Never? Is it so clear that the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause intended to restrict the authority of local governments to
assist disadvantaged racial minorities? Did the authors of the Free
Speech Clause think they were protecting commercial advertising
and campaign expenditures by corporations?) Bork writes as if ir-
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responsible political tactics are practiced only by the left and as if
there are no exceptions or qualifications to the rule that "activists
of the 1960s" have "only contempt" for responsible politics. (p 11)
He depicts the Griswold litigation as a cabal of Yale professors
battling for the cultural validation of their sexually libertine values. (pp 96-97)
Bork's problem runs deeper than conspiratorial themes, however, for those themes betray a general willingness to believe too
quickly in the novel or daring idea. Indeed, some of the book's fundamental claims are doubtful because they rest so heavily on the
challenging abstraction and ignore the ordinary and concrete. As
correct as Bork's criticism of Griswold may be in principle, it just
seems fanciful to regard judicial creation of the right to privacy as
a threat to our form of government. Such an allegation places too
little value on what Bork purports to respect: a sense of history
and the public's common sense. The public, after all, has had experience with the right to contraceptives for considerable time now
and senses in that experience no real danger. More generally, what
most undermines the sense of outraged urgency in Bork's argument that the rule of law is in jeopardy is his own survey of political judging in American history; according to that history, the rule
of law has been in some jeopardy since Calder v Bull in 1789.
Bork ascribes to his former colleagues the vice of being overattracted to generalizations and principles. He is right-law professors tolerate and reward abstract writing that is every bit as
quirky, conspiratorial, and doomsdayish as Bork's. Space limitations preclude anything like a full set of illustrations, but a few
notable examples come to mind. Certainly much of the free speech
literature is characterized by exaggerated fears and extreme
claims.3 5 Scholarly evaluations of the Burger Court were often notable for their conspiratorial cast.36 The commentary on abortion,

11 Some of these are described in Bollinger, The Tolerant Society at 79, 88-89, 100-101
(cited in note 4). See also Vincent Blasi, ed, The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution
That Wasn't chs 1, 2 (Yale, 1983).
" In fact, a basic theme was, with somewhat different emphasis, the same as
Bork's-that the Burger Court imposed middle class values. See, for example, Mark V.
Tushnet,

'"

. . And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice"-Some Notes on the Supreme

Court 1972 Term, 1974 Wis L Rev 177, 180 (the Justices' real agenda was to promote interests of their "friends and neighbors"). To take an extreme example, Professor Catherine
MacKinnon's attacks on privacy and free speech cases, in the opinion of one reviewer, are
"pathological" and "obsessively enraged." See Michael Levin, Book Review, 5 Const Comm
201, 207-14 (1988) (review of Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Harvard,
1987), and Linda J. Nicholson, Gender and History (Columbia, 1986)). The Rehnquist
Court, according to a perfectly sane mainstream writer, is causing the Constitution to "van-
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exemplified by Tribe's reference to abortion laws as "the power to
sentence women to childbearing" (p 202),11 is sometimes strained
and apocalyptic. The brilliant, the imaginative, and the unlikely
abound in our images of judges-as moral prophets, as intellectual
demi-gods, as protectors of democracy, as Christlike parable-tellers, as saviors of "the very regime itself at some awful moment of
supreme peril." 8
My own favorite academic argument is Richard Wasserstrom's
extended analysis of the question whether a good society "would
be one in which an individual's sex was of no more significance...
than is eye color today." 39 Realizing that such a society would be
incompatible with almost all sexual differentiation-" [b]isexuality
. . . would be the typical intimate, sexual relationship" 4°-Wasserstrom hesitates in his endorsement. He has to admit, after all, that "substantial sexual differentiation is a virtually
universal phenomenon in human culture."'" This fact, he says,
might support an "argument" that "where there is a widespread,
virtually universal social practice . . . , there is probably some
good or important purpose served . . . ." Wasserstrom, however,
concludes that though this is an argument, "it is hard to see what
42
is attractive about it."
The virtue of Wasserstrom's analysis, like Bork's, is its bold,
imaginative quality. The disadvantage is that it elevates the conceptual over the experiential and historical, and thereby achieves
goofiness. Bork's constitutional jurisprudence may be thought demonstrably wrong-headed by more scholars than share my opinion
of Wasserstrom's thinking on sexual differentiation, but widespread rejection of his theory does not set Bork apart-not from
Herbert Wechsler or John Ely or Laurence Tribe or Ronald Dworkin or Roberto Unger. Bork is different, if at all, only in that his
demonstrably weak theory also strains against much of our shared

ish." Chemerinsky, 103 Harv L Rev 43 (cited in note 12).
37Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw § 15-10 at 1354 (cited in note 14).
" The quoted phrase comes from Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Progress 181 (Harper & Row, 1970). The other references are to Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights at 98-99 (cited in note 33) (prophets); Dworkin,
Law's Empire (cited in note 5) (demi-gods, namely, Hercules); John Hart Ely, Democracy
and Distrust (Harvard, 1980) (democracy); and Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the
Teaching of the Parables,93 Yale L J 455, 471 (1984) (parables).
11 Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism and Sexism, in John H. Garvey and T. Alexander

Aleinikoff, eds, Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader 360, 360 (West, 1989).
40
42

Id at 361.
Id at 365.
Id.
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experience with the Court's current practices. To insist on an interpretative approach that would require dismantling so much of
what-has come to seem normal and acceptable has, like Wasserstrom's musings, an unmoored quality. The facts are that political
judging is pervasive, it has accomplished some good, and it is
counted on by many people. Although they are less solidly established than the fact of heterosexual attraction, these facts, too,
ought to count for something. Bork's book does not make much
provision for such considerations, and when ito does, he becomes
(perversely) even less distinguishable from other legal scholars.
IV.
Constitutional scholarship is sometimes fanciful and adventuresome, but in the end it usually comes home to the Court. So
does Bork. It turns out that Bork finds the result in Brown v
Board of Educationto be quite consistent with the framers' intent.
(p 82) He also concludes that unreasonable sexual distinctions can
be objectively determined and are unconstitutional, 3 and that the
reapportionment decisions, while not supported by the Equal Protection Clause, are nonetheless dictated by "what the Founders
meant by a republican form of government." (p 86) Many distortions of real constitutional meaning, like the post-1937 Commerce
Clause cases, have to be lived with, according to Bork, because of
stare decisis. (p 306)
Indeed, what at first appears to be a forbidding jurisprudence
of original intent can-if you blink-transform itself into a conventional methodology not much different from Tribe's or Dworkin's. The giveaway comes early in the book, when Bork praises
Marbury v Madison and McCulloch v Maryland and describes
Chief Justice John Marshall as a faithful expositor of constitutional meaning.4 4 This is less of a jolt after Bork fully explains his
theory of interpretation-judges ought not make policy "not fairly
to be found in the Constitution .... ." (p 5)-but judges must engage in policymaking when they apply constitutional values to specific cases (pp 167, 189), and moral philosophy sometimes does assist judges in "deciding whether a new case is inside or outside an

'3 "Sexual differences obviously make some distinctions reasonable while others have
no apparent basis." (p 150)
" Bork's praise of these rulings emphasizes, as does most scholarly commentary, the
brilliance of Marshall's arguments from text and structure. (pp 20-28) Bork does not comment, however, on Marshall's failure to review evidence about the framers' intentions regarding either the power of judicial review or congressional power to incorporate banks.
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old principle." (p 254) Although principles must be applied rather
than invented, they must be applied so as to keep them relevant in
a changing world. (pp 168-69) Judges should apply "[t]he principles of the text." (p 5) These are to be understood as the framers
intended, but if intention is unclear or unknowable, principles
should be inferred from "the general language of the clause" and
defined at "the level of generality that interpretation of the words,
structure, and history of the Constitution fairly supports." (p 150)
Two judges engaged in this difficult task can arrive at opposite results in the same case (p 163); nevertheless, they are sufficiently
constrained if they seek "the best understanding of the principle
enacted." (p 163)
Bork, then, should not be misunderstood when he repeatedly
and confidently refers to what is actually "in" the Constitution.4 5
He does not conceive of our fundamental charter as a box that can
be opened and examined; rather, the definiteness of his legal conclusions must be understood as expressing the rigorous and conscientious character of the mental process that has led to these
conclusions.
Bork's methodology, understood this way, is not frivolous or
radical. In its essentials it is the conventional approach, aspired to
by most justices and endorsed by mainstream theorists like Tribe
and Dworkin. 46 Its weakness is the same weakness that Bork identifies in other methods but does not recognize in his own version of
the theory: It provides no significant constraint and thus raises the
suspicion that interpretations reflect class and partisan biases.
Moreover, Bork's interpretative method invites the same serious
charges that Bork makes against many others when he asserts that
their interpretations are hypocritical and that their "law" represents deceit. This is because for Bork, as for mainstream theorists,47 interpretation is difficult and serious work, and its results

15 He refers to the "actual Constitution" (pp 130, 171) and to meaning that "does not
come out of the Constitution but is forced into it." (p 114)
4" Douglas Laycock has shown that serious interpretation of this sort is capable of generating virtually all modern constitutional doctrines, including the right to abortion and the
various levels of equal protection review. Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously:
A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 Tex L Rev 343 (1981) (reviewing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard, 1980)). Mark Tushnet argues that it could generate his own
socialist agenda. Tushnet, 65 Tex L Rev 777 (cited in note 18).
" The definiteness of Tribe's assertions about the content of the law apparently arises
from this same sense of intellectual seriousness, for he agrees with Bork's statement (at the
close of his testimony) that a judge should "'interpret the law and not make it.'" Bork
Hearings at 1274 (cited in note 24). For a few of Professor Tribe's rather certain views on
what the Constitution really means, see notes 27-28. Similarly, for all his sophistication
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are properly framed in terms of true meaning. Given the inevitability of suspicions about political agendas, such elevated phrasing inevitably sounds manipulative to a non-believer.
Hence, Bork is similar to mainstream law professors not only
in his vulnerability to the severe accusation of deceit but also in
his willingness to make the charge. For example, a letter opposing
Bork's confirmation from one hundred law professors, including
Tribe, questioned whether Bork's views reflected "a consistent philosophy of judicial restraint rather than personal values. '4 Ronald
Dworkin has long insinuated that the idea of judicial restraint is a
cover for Republican politics, 49 and he has specifically identified
the underlying purpose in Bork's approach to judging as the promotion of what he variously terms "right-wing dogma" and "the
prejudices of the right. ' 50 For reasons that require considerable explanation, Dworkin does not think he is conceding anything about
his own commodious interpretative approach when he describes
Bork's as sufficiently loose to permit a political agenda to masquerade as constitutional imperatives. But, then, exactly the same can
be said of Bork and his assertions about Dworkin's political
objectives.
Bork, Dworkin, and Tribe all point to the same kind of evidence in denying any covert political agenda. Bork tries to establish his good faith by repeatedly acknowledging that judicial usurabout the idea of intent, Ronald Dworkin can write unequivocally about "the responsibility
the framers imposed on [judges] to develop legal principles of moral breadth.. ...." Dworkin,
The Bork Nomination at 10 (cited in note 29). On the issue presented by Brown v Board of
Education, Dworkin writes: "The plaintiff schoolchildren are being cheated of what their
Constitution, properly interpreted, defines as independent and equal standing in the republic." Dworkin, Law's Empire at 389 (cited in note 5). Indeed, he firmly defends definite
assertions about what the law "is" against the charge that those who speak in such terms,
while pretending to have discovered more than what the law "is," have only discovered what
it "should be." Id at 261-62. He replies:
The grounds of law lie in integrity, in the best constructive interpretation of past legal
decisions, and that law is therefore sensitive to justice. . .. So there is no way Hercules
can report his conclusion ... except to say that the law, as he understands it, is [as
Hercules asserts it to be].
Id at 262 (emphasis in original). As it is with Hercules, so it is with Dworkin, Tribe, and
Bork.
48 Bork Hearings at 1336 (cited in note 24).
41 In an early and famous essay against the idea of judicial restraint, Dworkin begins by
associating the idea with Richard Nixon. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 131
(Harvard, 1977). He then adopts the McCarthy-esque device of using "'Nixon' to refer, not
to Nixon, but to any politician holding the set of attitudes about the Supreme Court that he
made explicit ....
Id at 132. He explains: "There was, fortunately, only one real Nixon,
but there are, in the special sense which I use the name, many Nixons." Id. Yes, and some
were named Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
50 Dworkin, The Bork Nomination at 10 (cited in note 29).
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pations have in the past had right-wing objectives and by
criticizing people like Epstein and Siegan. (pp 36-49, 224-30) Similarly, while testifying against Bork, Tribe emphasized that he had
supported the conservative nominees Sandra Day O'Connor and
Antonin Scalia.5 Dworkin pronounces himself satisfied that
Anthony Kennedy, although conservative, does have enough of a
52
judicial philosophy to be fit for the Court.
Bork and the leading mainstream theorists, then, are alike in
the fundamental riddle that they present (and in knowing that
they present it). To what extent do they believe their own interpretive claims? To what extent are those claims coldly cynical? My
opinion is that, at some level, they all believe their own claims and
are not hypocrites or liars. I suspect that this opinion would be
greeted by knowing guffaws in faculty lounges around the country;
and, if I am right in this suspicion, then unfortunately there is
more truth in Bork's general assessment of our profession than we
probably will care to dwell on.
The reason for my benign view is not especially benign. It
seems likely to me that the inspirational but terrible hold that
ideas can have over people is even stronger for those who especially value abstractions and pride themselves on intellect. Justice
Brennan, I think, does believe that in the constitutional text there
is a "sparkling vision" (p 219)" s that is inconsistent with the death
Bork Hearings at 1272 (cited in note 24).
Dworkin thought that, unlike Bork, Kennedy had adopted a tenet central to a legal
philosophy. Kennedy would demand not only "some demonstrated historical link ... [to]
the announced declarations and language of the framers," but would also look to "our ethical culture, our shared beliefs, our common vision." Ronald Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, NY Rev Books 36, 42 (Dec 17, 1987) (citation omitted). A few details of Kennedy's
philosophy, however, still remained to be worked out at the time of his confirmation. He
disclaimed any "unitary theory of interpretation" and confessed to be "searching... for the
correct balance in constitutional interpretation." Report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, S Exec Rep No 100-13, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988) (citation omitted). He did feel sure, nevertheless, that "[t]he Constitution cannot be divorced from its
logic and its language, the intention of its Framers, the precedents of the law, and the
shared traditions and historic values of our people." Id at 10 (emphasis added, citation
omitted). Depending on how a judge assesses our shared traditions regarding judicial power,
of course, it is quite possible that this philosophy might turn out to be much like Bork's. A
hint in this direction is provided by Kennedy's assurance that:
[T]his doesn't mean the Constitution changes. It just means that we have a better
perspective of it ....
It just means that our understanding of it changes.
Id at 8 (citation omitted). Compare Bork in The Tempting of America at 168 ("The world
changes in which unchanging values find their application.").
"I Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown Univ (Oct 12, 1985), reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written
Constitution 11, 18 (Federalist Society, 1986).
62

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:633

penalty, just as Ronald Dworkin believes that constitutional prin-

ciples prohibit restrictions on homosexuality. For them, as for
Robert Bork and many other powerful minds, there is a real Constitution, and it would be a dereliction of duty not to enforce it no
matter who disagrees or how many object. This fierce ambition,
this submission to abstraction, can be viewed as a weakness, even
as a dangerous weakness, but it does not differentiate Bork from
those who define the mainstream of our profession. At any rate,
the major alternative to intellectual imperialism in that mainstream is political deceit.
V.
It is potentially dangerous for any judge to hold a firm belief
that an interpretive method is sufficiently constrained to protect
against a covert political program, because this kind of confidence
can create self-delusion. Entranced by the apparent strength of
historical evidence (or the power of a principle or the clarity of a
moral vision), judges might not anticipate or be attuned to the
subtle influences of their own desires. Although The Tempting of
America contains much that is useful and admirable and even courageous, its deficiencies provide a number of reasons for doubting
whether Bork should have been elevated to the Supreme
Court-or indeed, whether those mainstream scholars he resembles
should be in the future. The book displays, as I have said, an overconfident intellectualism, a stridently critical instinct, an attachment to theory that subordinates the wisdom of experience and the
weight of practice, an affinity for the novel and audacious that
verges on the fanciful and conspiratorial, and an excessive devotion
to independent judicial power.
Given this array of deficiencies, which were to some degree evident in Bork's earlier writings, one of the reasons frequently given
for opposing Bork is startling. Judith Resnik, for instance, testified
that Bork "is hostile to the very act of adjudication ... [and] disdains and distrusts judging itself. 5' 4 Resnik was referring to Bork's

judicial opinions, in which she saw a tendency to decide more issues than necessary and to limit the extent to which courts hear
claims of wrongdoing. Since many great jurists have displayed one
or another of these tendencies, Resnik's accusation is perplexing.
(Does Justice Brennan hate judging? Did Justice Holmes?) It
seems even more perplexing after reading The Tempting of
" Bork Hearings at 2548 (cited in note 24).
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America because the book is such an urgent effort to save judging-and law itself-from an oblivion that Bork plainly and intensely fears.
In at least one way, however, the book does suggest that Bork
may be "hostile to the very act of adjudication." Bork savages not
only exotic judicial inquiries proposed by academics, but also ordinary doctrinal analyses of the sort judges actually employ every
day. Consider, for instance, the requirements that legislation serve
a legitimate governmental interest and be substantially related to
its objectives. Bork says of the first: "No theory of the legitimate
and important objectives of government ... is even conceivable."
(p 226) Of the second, he says that usually the social sciences cannot evaluate the means-ends connection (p 227) and that in important cases, "[d]epending on which way the government states the
objective, the law will be impossible to strike down or impossible
to uphold." (p 228) Bork writes as if he is making a rebuttal to a
limited theoretical proposal, but, of course, his rebuttal calls into
question a great mass of constitutional doctrine. Accordingly, it
might be fair to say that he hates (or, at least, rejects) judging as it
is now usually practiced and that the implications of this rejection
are wider than Bork seems to recognize.
Like so much of what can be criticized in Bork's writings, the
nature of this "hostility" to judging confirms how indistinguishable
he is from the mainstream. Bork himself often chides scholars for
not facing up to the implications of their arguments on judicial
review. For example, he quotes Paul Brest's assertion that "all adjudication requires making choices among the levels of generality
on which to articulate principles, and all such choices are inherently non-neutral." (pp 148-49)" 5 Bork replies that if this were correct, "we must either resign ourselves to a Court that is a 'naked
power organ' or require the Court to stop making 'constitutional'
decisions." (p 149) Similarly, in responding to Justice Brennan's
skepticism about the possibility of accurately determining the intent of the framers, Bork writes:
The result of the search [for intent] is never perfection; it is
simply the best we can do; and the best we can do must be
regarded as good enough-or we must abandon the enterprise
of law and, most especially, that of judicial review. (p 163)

" Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L J 1063, 1091-92 (1981).
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In short, both Bork and mainstream theorists can be accused of
coming very close to the conclusion that judicial review is illegitimate and should be abandoned. Bork claims that he (but not most
other theorists) can avoid this conclusion because he believes that
objective determinations of intent are possible.
But what if Bork in fact does not believe that intent can bind?
This seems unlikely, but it is worth some consideration. (Remember that Bork concedes that intent is not always knowable and
that two conscientious judges can apply historical principles to
reach opposite conclusions in a case; also note the phrasing "the
best we can do must be regarded as good enough.") Then Bork
would have to be hostile, not just to current doctrines, but to judicial review itself-for the same reasons that the positions of many
mainstream scholars effectively make them (according to Bork) opponents of judicial review.
This possibility would seem to make Bork's argument on behalf of neutral judging a sham and, therefore, would be inconsistent with the evident sincerity of Bork's commitment to a constrained judiciary and the rule of law. But wait a moment more: In
the past, similar "shams" have been given a respectable defense.
Recall, for instance, Justice Hugo Black's forcefully expressed view
that the Free Speech Clause should be read literally as an absolute
protection of all speech. This position is at least as implausible as
Bork's theory of original intent, and commentators early on said
that the highly intelligent Justice Black must have understood the
insuperable difficulties underlying his absolutist position.57 Black's
declarations came to be explained as an apparent intellectual ruse
and were eventually defended on the grounds that the difficulties
of his position were matters of logic, while the reasons for his position were rhetorical; his purpose was to communicate, and thereby
create, a psychological predisposition or mindset appropriate for
protecting speech.
The same explanation could certainly be used to defend
Bork's insistence-in the face of all the analytic difficulties-on
the possibility of neutral derivation and application of historical
intent. Indeed, the Black analogy is the most obvious way to understand the vehemence of the jurisprudential debate over the
place of intent and principle in constitutional law. Like the debate
"6See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 NYU L Rev 865, 867 (1960); and Smith v
California, 361 US 147, 157-59 (1959) (Black concurring).
"' Charles L. Black Jr., Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
222 Harper's 63, 65 (Feb 1961).
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between Black and the interest balancers, the positions in the debate between Bork and the "mainstream" sound as if they are far
apart, but under examination they quietly converge. Bork approves
of using moral philosophy to apply principles under modern conditions, and Tribe insists that judges should apply, not make, law.
The sense that much is at stake depends on the assumption that
both positions, even if descriptively and analytically similar, are
accurate expressions of profoundly different emphases and
inclinations.
The analogy to Black's absolutism is not by itself, of course, a
defense of the weight Bork puts on original intent. Black's rhetorical purposes could be justified as consistent with the underlying
objectives of freedom of speech. What purpose would be served by
insisting on the highly general rhetoric of original intent? Near the
end of his book, Bork says this:
The attempt to define individual liberties by abstract moral
philosophy, though it is said to broaden our liberties, is actually likely to make them more vulnerable. I am not referring
here to the freedom to govern ourselves but to the freedoms
from government guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the
post-Civil War amendments. Those constitutional liberties
were not produced by abstract reasoning. They arose out of
historical experience ....

Attempts to frame theories that re-

move from democratic control areas of life our nation's Founders intended to place there can achieve power only if abstractions are regarded as legitimately able to displace the
Constitution's text and structure and the history that gives
our legal rights life, rootedness, and meaning. It is no small
matter to discredit the foundations upon which our constitutional freedoms have always been sustained and substitute as
a bulwark only the abstract propositions of moral philosophy.
To do that is, in fact, to display a lightmindedness terrifying
in its frivolity. Our freedoms do not ultimately depend upon
the pronouncements of judges sitting in a row. They depend
upon their acceptance by the American people, and a major
factor in that acceptance is the belief that these liberties are
inseparable from the founding of the nation. (p 353)
This powerful passage suggests that if Bork's jurisprudence is a
rhetorical argument, his purpose might be to sustain a set of mythical beliefs and emotional ties necessary for the protection of individual liberty. Viewed this way, the book has both appeal and
gravity; it would be an argument, made for a high purpose, based
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on plausible assumptions about the deep underpinnings of successful democratic institutions.
Considering that Hugo Black was a respected figure (criticized,
to be sure, but never cast out as a heretic), this interpretation
might make both Bork and his book more attractive to law professors and jurists. But relative acceptability would be accomplished
in deeply ironic ways. The Black analogy requires characterizing
Bork, who rejects the propriety of most available political checks
over the judiciary, 58 as someone who believes the people are the
ultimate guardians of their rights; it would turn a man who
overvalues logic and abstraction into someone whose aim is to
shape and reinforce the sentimental bases of political community;
it would convert an author who disdains expressive writing5" into a
rhetorician. That is, Robert Bork's views might be made more intellectually and morally acceptable to the legal academy if he were
conceived of in a way that significantly differentiated him from the
profession that once turned on him in indignant recognition.

Bork criticizes political demonstrations directed at the Court (pp 3-4, 116), the influence of public opinion generally (p 313), political confirmation hearings (pp 313-14, 346),
and congressional efforts to change judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment
(p 325).
" Bork writes that judges should "apply law and not emotion" (p 62); he criticizes
Justice Douglas's lyricism in Griswold as "incoherent" (p 97); he calls "ordered liberty" "a
splendid phrase but not a major premise" (p 118); he condemns the idea, expressed in
Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503 (1977), that a liberty might be "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" as "pretty vaporous stuff" (p 118); and his
retort to claims about Justice Blackmun's "passion" and "eloquence" is that they are "poor
substitutes for judicial reasoning." (p 120)

